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To improve the performance of a quantum key distribution (QKD) system, high speed, low dark
count single photon detectors (or low noise homodyne detectors) are required. However, in prac-
tice, a fast detector usually is noisy. Here, we propose a “dual detectors” method to improve the
performance of a practical QKD system with realistic detectors: the legitimate receiver randomly
uses either a fast (but noisy) detector or a quiet (but slow) detector to measure the incoming
quantum signals. The measurement results from the quiet detector can be used to bound eaves-
dropper’s information, while the measurement results from the fast detector are used to generate
secure key. We apply this idea into various QKD protocols. Simulation results demonstrate signifi-
cant improvements in both BB84 protocol with ideal single photon source and Gaussian-modulated
coherent states (GMCS) protocol, while in decoy state BB84 protocol with weak coherent source,
the improvement is moderate.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
One important practical application of quantum infor-
mation is quantum key distribution (QKD), whose un-
conditional security is based on the fundamental laws of
quantum mechanics [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. In principle,
any eavesdropping attempts by a third party (Eve) will
unavoidably introduce quantum bit errors, so, it is pos-
sible for the legitimate users (Alice and Bob) to upper
bound the amount of information acquired by the eaves-
dropper from some system parameters and the measured
quantum bit error rate (QBER). If the QBER is not too
high and the transmission efficiency is not too low, Al-
ice and Bob can then distill out a final secure key by
performing error correction (to correct errors due to im-
perfections in the QKD system and errors due to eaves-
dropping) and privacy amplification (to remove Eve’s in-
formation about the final key).
A practical QKD system has imperfections, which will
contribute to QBER even in the absence of Eve. If Alice
and Bob cannot distinguish the intrinsic QBER due to
imperfections from the one induced by Eve, to guarantee
the unconditional security, they have to assume that all
errors are originated from eavesdropping. Under this as-
sumption, the intrinsic QBER will increase the costs for
both error correction and privacy amplification. On the
other hand, if Alice and Bob do have a way to distinguish
the intrinsic QBER from the one due to eavesdropping,
then the cost for the privacy amplification can be saved
[9].
One important error source in a practical QKD sys-
tem is the noise of the receiver’s detector, for example,
the dark count probability of a single photon detector
(SPD) or the “excess noise” of a homodyne detector. As
the distance between Alice and Bob increases (which is
equivalent to a higher channel loss), the contribution to
QBER from detector’s noise becomes more significant.
As the QBER is over some threshold, no secure key can
be generated. The maximum secure distance of a QKD
system is thus limited by the detector’s noise. On the
other hand, the secure key rate is proportional to the
operating rate of the QKD system, which is mainly de-
termined by the speed of the detector. In brief, an ideal
detector should be fast and noiseless. Unfortunately, in
practice, high speed detectors are normally noisy.
In classical metrology, there are many elegant methods
to combat various noises associated with the measure-
ment devices. It is natural to ask this question: can we
introduce classical “calibration” processes into a QKD
system to deal with various noises associate with its in-
trinsic imperfections? An intuitive idea is as follow: the
receiver, Bob, adds a high speed optical switch at the
entrance of his device. He uses this switch to randomly
block some input pulses. The measurement results with
no input signal can be used to estimate the intrinsic
noise of the detector. Alice and Bob can further estimate
among the total QBER (measured when Bob’s switch is
open), how much is contributed by this intrinsic detector
noise. The QBER caused by the intrinsic detector noise
does not contribute to Eve’s information, only the QBER
above it does. Since Alice and Bob can bound Eve’s in-
formation more tightly, the cost for privacy amplification
will be lowered. We remark that the cost for error cor-
rection remains the same, because whether the error is
caused by eavesdropping or by the intrinsic noise, Alice
and Bob will treat them equally during error correcting
process.
Note, there is an implicit assumption in the above ar-
gument, that is, Eve cannot control the intrinsic noise
of the detector, or at most, she can increase but not de-
crease it. If Eve can decrease the detector noise when
the switch is open, then the above argument is violated,
since Bob cannot use the detector noise measured with
switch close to estimate the detector noise with switch
open. Unfortunately, this kind of assumption is not easy
2to justify. The first rule in quantum cryptography is: to
guaranty unconditional secure, we always make assump-
tions that are most favorable to Eve. In this case, we
allow Eve to fully control the noise of Bob’s detector,
and the above intuitive idea cannot work.
Here we propose a “dual detectors” method to improve
the performance of a QKD system based on realistic de-
tectors. The basic idea is quite simple: Bob has two
detectors, one is fast but noisy, while the other one is
quiet but slow. For each incoming quantum signal, Bob
randomly chooses to use either the fast detector (with a
high probability) or the slow detector (with a low proba-
bility) to do the measurement. During the classical data
post-processing stage, Alice and Bob use the QBER mea-
sured with the slow (quiet) detector to bound Eve’s infor-
mation, and they use the measurement results from the
fast detector to produce a secure key. Since Eve cannot
predict which detector Bob will choose, her attack is in-
dependent on which detector is used. So, Alice and Bob
can apply the bound (about Eve’s information) acquired
from the low-noise detector to the results acquired from
fast (but noisy) detector. By using a tighter bound about
Eve’s information, the cost for privacy amplification will
be lowered.
We remark that in this paper, we assume that the
background noise of Bob’s detector is dominated by its
intrinsic noise. This assumption may be not applicable in
some QKD setups, where strong synchronization pulses
and quantum signals go through the same fiber. In that
case, the background noise may be dominated by the
stray light from the intense synchronization pulses [10].
We remark that to prevent the eavesdropper to ex-
plore the difference between the two detectors on spec-
tral/temporal responses, a narrow-band optical filter can
be employed at the entrance of Bob’s system and a high
speed optical switch with a well defined open-window can
be employed to randomly guide the input photon to one
of the two detectors. We remark that instead of employ-
ing two physically different detectors, it may be possible
for Bob to run the same detector at different conditions
to achieve the same goal.
In this paper, we apply the “dual detectors” idea
into three different protocols: namely, the BB84 proto-
col with perfect single photon source [2](Section II), the
decoy state BB84 protocol with weak coherent source
[11, 12, 13](Section III), and the Gaussian-modulated
coherent states (GMCS) protocol [5] (Section IV). Sim-
ulation results demonstrate significant improvements in
both BB84 protocol with ideal single photon source and
GMCS protocol, while in decoy state BB84 protocol with
weak coherent source, the improvement is moderate. Fi-
nally, In Section V, we discuss the possibility of imple-
menting the “dual detectors” idea presented in this pa-
per.
II. SINGLE PHOTON BB84 QKD WITH DUAL
DETECTORS
The most well known and mature QKD protocol is
BB84 protocol [2]. In this section, we assume that an
ideal single photon source is employed. In this case, the





Here the factor 1/2 is due to half of the time, Alice and
Bob use different bases. r is the pulse repetition rate
of the QKD system. Q1 is the overall gain (taking into
account of channel loss, optical loss inside Bob and the
detection efficiency of SPD), which is defined as the ratio
of Bob’s detection events to the total signal pulses sent
by Alice. e1 is the QBER. f(x) is the bidirectional er-
ror correction efficiency, and H2(x) is the binary entropy
function, given by
H2(x) = −x log2(x) − (1− x) log2(1− x). (2)
Note in Eq.(1), the term f(e1)H2(e1) is the cost for error
correction, while the term H2(e1) is the cost for privacy
amplification. With “dual detectors” method, Alice and
Bob use a “quiet” SPD (which yields a lower QBER at
long distance) to give a tighter bound on Eve’s informa-
tion H2(e1). This tighter bound can be used to lower
the cost for privacy amplification when Alice/Bob use a
“noisier” (but faster) SPD to generate the secure key.
Note the “dual detectors” method cannot be simply
explained as using the quiet detector to estimate the dark
count of the noisy detector. It should be understood as
using the quiet detector to bound Eve’s information more
tightly. Assume for each pulse from Alice, right beyond
Bob’s optical switch (for randomly choosing detector),
Eve’s potential information is I0eve, which is independent
on which detector Bob will choose. We can image Bob’s
two detectors as two independent QKD systems, each of
them can upper bound Eve’s information properly. This
means the two bounds (on Eve’s information) acquired





I0eve. So, Bob can use either of I
1
eve (which is quantified
by the QBER measured with detector1) or I2eve to do the
privacy amplification without compromising the security
of the system.
We model the QKD system as follow [12]. The gain of
QKD system is
Q1 = Y0 +GchGBobηD (3)
where Y0 is the background rate, Gch is the channel ef-
ficiency, GBob is the optical transmittance in Bob’s sys-
tem, and ηD is the efficiency of SPD. Here we assume
Y0 ≪ 1 and GchGBobηD ≪ 1. The quantum channel be-
tween Alice and Bob is Telecom fiber with attenuation
α = 0.21dB/km. The channel efficiency can be estimated
by Gch = 10
−αL/10, where L is the fiber length in km.
3The QBER is determined by
e1 = [e0Y0 + edetGchGBobηD]/Q1 (4)
Here e0 = 0.5 is the error rate of background. edet is the
probability that a single photon hit the wrong detector,
which characterizes the alignment and stability of the op-
tical system and the cross-talk between adjacent signals,
etc.
We assume that Bob randomly chooses to use one of
the following two SPDs: the first one is fast but noisy
(with operating speed r1, efficiency η
(1)
D and dark count
probability Y
(1)
0 ), while the second one is slow but quiet
(with operating speed r2, efficiency η
(2)
D and dark count
probability Y
(2)
0 ). To improve the overall efficiency (only
the fast SPD contributes to secure key), the probability
of choosing the slow SPD should be small (in asymptotic
case, it can approach to zero). The secure key rate of the

















1 are the QBERs measured with SPD1
and SPD2, respectively.
Numerical simulations have been performed based on
different combinations of SPDs.
A. Case One: 1GHz up-conversion SPD and
transition-edge sensor SPD
Two different types of SPD are employed. SPD1 is
a GHz SPD based on up-conversion [14, 15, 16], while
SPD2 is a “low noise” SPD based on transition-edge sen-
sors (TESs) [17, 18]. Simulation parameters are summa-
rized as follow: α = 0.21dB/km, f(x) = 1.22; GBob =
0.16 and edet = 0.018 [17]; r1 = 1GHz, η
(1)
D = 0.059 and
Y
(1)
0 = 1.3 × 10
−5 [15]; r2 = 2.5MHz, η
(2)
D = 0.5 and
Y
(2)
0 = 3× 10
−7[18].
Fig.1 shows the simulation results. The key rate of
“dual-detector” system is higher than either of the single
SPD systems up to ∼ 124km. Note, at a longer distance,
when the system with SPD2 alone yields a higher key
rate, Bob can simply use SPD2 itself.
B. Case Two: 10GHz up-conversion SPD and
transition-edge sensor SPD
The 1GHz SPD1 in Case One was replaced by a
10GHz SPD, which was reported in a recent DPS-QKD
experiment [16]. Note, in this case, due to the high pulse
repetition rate and non-zero time jitter, the cross-talk
between adjacent pulses is high. This contributes a high
QBER independent of fiber length, which equivalent to
a high edet for SPD1. The parameters for SPD1 are:
FIG. 1: Simulation results for BB84 protocol with single
photon source. Simulation parameters: α = 0.21dB/km,
f(x) = 1.22; GBob = 0.16 and edet = 0.018 [17]; r1 = 1GHz,
η
(1)
D = 0.059 and Y
(1)
0 = 1.3 × 10
−5 [15]; r2 = 2.5MHz,
η
(2)
D = 0.5 and Y
(2)
0 = 3× 10
−7[18].The key rate of “dual de-
tectors” system is higher than either of the single SPD system
up to ∼ 124km. Note, at a longer distance, when the system
with SPD2 alone yields a higher key rate, Bob can simply use
SPD2 itself.
r1 = 10GHz, η
(1)
D = 0.0027, Y
(1)




det = 0.097 [16]. Other parameters are same as in Case
One.
Fig.2 shows the simulation results. The key rate of
“dual detectors” system is significantly higher than either
of the single SPD system up to ∼ 200km. Note, no secure
key can be produced by SPD1 alone at any distance.
C. Case Three: two 10GHz up-conversion SPDs
In Case one and Case Two, the operation principles of
the two SPDs are quite different. To prevent Eve from
exploring the difference between the two detectors, spe-
cial counter measures, such as narrowband filter, may
be required, as we discussed in previous section. In this
case, two identical 10GHz SPDs are employed to remove
the asymmetry between the two detectors. The proba-
bility for choosing SPD1 is close to one, so it still suffers
from the high QBER due to the cross-talk between ad-
jacent pulses. Since the probability for choosing SPD2
is quite small (say 0.01), the cross-talk between adjacent
pulses can be neglected, and the QBER from SPD2 will
be much lower. Simulation parameters are summarized
as follow: r1 = 10GHz, η
(1)
D = 0.0027, Y
(1)









0 = 3.2 × 10
−9 and e
(2)
det = 0.018. Other parameters
are same as before.
Fig.3 shows the simulation results. The key rate of
4FIG. 2: Simulation results for BB84 protocol with single pho-








det = 0.097 [16]. Other param-
eters are same as in Fig.1. The key rate of “dual detectors”
system is significantly higher than either of the single SPD
system up to ∼ 200km. Note, no secure key can be produced
by SPD1 alone at any distance.
FIG. 3: Simulation results for BB84 protocol with sin-
gle photon source. Simulation parameters: r1 = 10GHz,
η
(1)
D = 0.0027, Y
(1)
0 = 3.2 × 10
−9 and e
(1)
det = 0.097 [16];
r2 = 100MHz, η
(2)
D = 0.0027, Y
(2)




det = 0.018; Other parameters are same as in Fig.1. The key
rate of “dual detectors” system is significantly higher than
either of the single SPD system up to ∼ 190km. Note, no
secure key can be produced by SPD1 alone at any distance.
“dual detectors” system is significantly higher than ei-
ther of the single SPD systems up to ∼ 190km. Again,
no secure key can be produced by SPD1 alone at any
distance.
In a brief summary, our simulation results demonstrate
that the “dual detectors” method can improve the perfor-
mance of single photon BB84 QKD system dramatically.
We remark that the same idea also can be applied to
imperfect single photon source.
III. DECOY STATE BB84 QKD WITH DUAL
DETECTORS
Currently, most of QKD experiments are conducted
with a phase randomized weak coherent source. The pho-
ton number of each pulse follows a Poisson distribution
with a parameter µ as its expected photon number set




r[Q1 − f(Eµ)QµH2(Eµ)−Q1H2(e1)]. (6)
Here Qµ, Eµ are the gain and the overall QBER of sig-
nal states, while Q1, e1 are the gain and the QBER of
single-photon components. Note only Qµ, Eµ can be
determined from experimental data directly, while the
bounds on Q1 and e1 have to be estimated based on the
specific QKD protocol adopted and how to model the
QKD system.
Here, we assume that Alice and Bob perform ideal
decoy state BB84 protocol [11, 12]. In the asymptotic
case, the estimated value of the above four parameters
are given by [12]
Qµ = Y0 + 1− e
−ηµ (7)
Eµ = [e0Y0 + edet(1 − e
−ηµ)]/Qµ (8)
Q1 = (Y0 + η)µe
−µ (9)
e1 = (e0Y0 + edetη)µe
−µ/Q1 (10)
Here η = GchGBobηD is the overall efficiency of the QKD
system.






With “dual detectors” methods, we expect that Alice
and Bob can obtain a tighter bound on e1, thus lower the
cost for privacy amplification. Simulation parameters are
summarized as follow: α = 0.21dB/km, f(x) = 1.22, µ =
0.73 ; GBob = 0.16 and edet = 0.018 [17]; r1 = 1GHz,
η
(1)
D = 0.059 and Y
(1)
0 = 1.3 × 10
−5 [15]; r2 = 2.5MHz,
η
(2)
D = 0.5 and Y
(2)
0 = 3 × 10
−7 [18]. The optimal µ
is the case of “dual detectors” is chosen based on the
parameters of the fast detector. The simulation results
are shown in Fig.4. We see moderate improvement up to
∼ 82km.
The limited improvement in this protocol can be un-
derstand from Eq.(6). The second term at the right hand
side of Eq.(6) is the cost for error correction, while the
third term is the cost for privacy amplification. Since
5FIG. 4: Simulation results for Decoy state BB84 protocol
with weak coherent source: Simulation parameters: α =
0.21dB/km, f(x) = 1.22, µ = 0.73; GBob = 0.16 and edet =
0.018 [17]; r1 = 1GHz, η
(1)
D = 0.059 and Y
(1)
0 = 1.3 × 10
−5
[15]; r2 = 2.5MHz, η
(2)
D = 0.5 and Y
(2)
0 = 3 × 10
−7[18].The
key rate of “dual detectors” system is higher than either of
the single SPD system up to ∼ 82km. Note, even without any
privacy amplification, the improvement is this case in moder-
ate.
f(Eµ)QµH2(Eµ) is significantly larger than Q1H2(e1),
the error correction term will dominate the privacy am-
plification term. The “dual detectors” system only al-
lows us to reduce the privacy amplification term, but not
the error correction term. So, any improvement due to
the “dual detectors” system for decoy state BB84 proto-
col over Telecom fibers will be moderate. This point is
clearly illustrated by our numerical simulations in Fig.4
: even Alice and Bob do not perform any privacy am-
plification, the improvements of the secure key rate and
secure distance are moderate.
IV. GAUSSIAN-MODULATED COHERENT
STATES QKD WITH DUAL DETECTORS
Recently, GMCS QKD has drawn a lot of attentions
for its potential high secure key rate, especially at rela-
tively short distance [5, 19, 20, 21, 22]. In this protocol
[5], Alice draws two random numbers XA and PA from a
Gaussian distribution of mean zero and variance VA (in
shot-noise units), and sends the coherent state |XA+iPA〉
to Bob. Bob randomly chooses to measure either the
phase or the amplitude quadrature with a phase mod-
ulator and a homodyne detector. During the classical
communication stage, Bob informs Alice which quadra-
ture he measures for each pulse and Alice will drop the
other one. Eventually, they can work out a set of cor-
related Gaussian variables, which will be further trans-
ferred to a secure key. It has been shown in [5] that with
“reverse reconciliation” (RR) protocol [20], this scheme
can tolerate high channel loss on the condition that the
excess noise (the noise above vacuum noise) is not too
high, while with “direct reconciliation” (DR) protocol
[19], this scheme can yields a higher key rate at relatively
short distance.
A. Direct Reconciliation Protocol
We assume the symmetry on the noise characters be-
tween the amplitude quadrature measurement and phase
quadrature measurement. For Gaussian additive-noise
channels, the mutual information between Bob and Alice
IAB and the one between Alice and Eve IAE are given
by [19]
IAB = (1/2) log2[(V + χ)/(1 + χ)] (12)
IAE = (1/2) log2[(V + 1/χ)/(1 + 1/χ)] (13)
where V = VA+1 is the variance of Alice’s field quadra-
tures in shot-noise units, χ = χvac + ε is the equivalent
input noise, where χvac = (1 − G)/G is the “vacuum
noise” associate with the overall transmission efficiency
G, while ε is the “excess noise”. G = GchGdet, where
Gch is the channel efficiency and Gdet is the detection
efficiency.
Note, since ε is the “excess noise” referred to input,
it can be described by ε = εpre + εdet/G, where εpre
and εdet are the “excess noises” associate with imperfec-
tions in state preparation and homodyne detection, re-
spectively. Obviously, at long distance (G is small), the
main contribution to ε is from detector noise.
The security key rate of a DR protocol is given by [19]
R1 = r(βIAB − IAE) (14)
where r is the repetition rate of the QKD system and
β ∈ (0, 1) is the efficiency of DR protocol.
In GMCS QKD system, the “excess noise” plays a sim-
ilar role as the dark count probability of SPD is BB84
protocol. The “dual detectors” scheme can be employed
to improve the performance of a GMCS QKD system
based on realistic homodyne detector, as in the case of
BB84 protocol. Specifically, at the classical communica-
tion stage, Alice and Bob use the measurement results
from the quiet detector and Eq.(13) to estimate IAE
and the measurement results from the fast detector and
Eq.(12) to calculate IAB. Using Eq.(12-14), the secure
key rate of the “dual detectors” scheme can be derived
as
R2 = r1{(β/2) log2[(V + χvac + ε1)/(1 + χvac + ε1)]
−(1/2) log2[(V + 1/(χvac + ε2))/(1 + 1/(χvac + ε2))]}
(15)
Simulation parameters are summarized as follow: α =
0.21dB/km, V = 40, β = 1, Gdet = 0.80; εpre = 0.05[21];
6FIG. 5: Simulation results for GMCS QKD with DR proto-
col. Simulation parameters: α = 0.21dB/km, V = 40, β = 1;
Gdet = 0.8, εpre = 0.05[21]; r1 = 82MHz, εdet1 = 0.43 [23];
r2 = 1MHz, εdet2 = 0.01[21]. With the “dual-detectors”
method, we see a significant improvement of the key rate
(more than one order) at relatively short distance(up to 5km).
r1 = 82MHz, εdet1 = 0.43 [23]; r2 = 1MHz, εdet2 =
0.01[21].
Fig.5 shows the simulation results. With the “dual
detectors” method, we see a significant improvement of
the key rate (more than one order) at relatively short
distance (up to 5km).
B. Reverse Reconciliation Protocol
In RR protocols, Bob sends classical information to
Alice, who in turn incorporates the transmission errors
in her initial data. The security key rate of a RR protocol
is given by [5, 21]
R1 = r(βIBA − IBE) (16)
where the mutual information between Bob and Alice
IBA and the one between Bob and Eve IBE are given by
[5]
IBA = (1/2) log2[(V + χ)/(1 + χ)] (17)
IBE = (1/2) log2[G
2(V + χ)(V −1 + χ)] (18)
We remark that to derive the above equations, Eve is
allowed to control the efficiency and excessive noise in
Bob’s system. In contrast, in [5, 21], the authors took
a “realistic” approach by assuming that the noises asso-
ciate with Bob’s system don’t contribute to Eve’s infor-
mation.
Note the mutual information between Bob and Eve
dependents on both the efficiency and the noise of the
FIG. 6: Simulation results for GMCS QKD with RR proto-
col. Simulation parameters: α = 0.21dB/km, V = 40, β = 1;
Gdet = 0.8, εpre = 0.05[21]; r1 = 82MHz, εdet1 = 0.43 [23];
r2 = 1MHz, εdet2 = 0.01[21]. With the “dual-detectors”
method, we see a significant improvement of the key rate
(more than one order) at relatively short distance(up to
17km). Note, in this case, no positive key rate can be achieved
with detector1 alone at any distance.
homodyne detector. In order to apply “dual detector”
idea, we have to assume that both detectors have the
same efficiency. Note this is an reasonable assumption in
practice, since the efficiency of the homodyne detector is
mainly determined by the optical coupling efficiency and
the quantum efficiency of the photo diode, both of them
are insensitive to the operation rate.
The secure key rate of the “dual detectors” scheme can
be derived as
R2 = r1{(β/2) log2[(V + χvac + ε1)/(1 + χvac + ε1)]
−(1/2) log2[G
2(V + χvac + ε2)(V
−1 + χvac + ε2)]}
(19)
Simulation parameters are same as in DR protocol.
Fig.6 shows the simulation results. With the “dual de-
tectors” method, we see a significant improvement of the
key rate (more than one order) at relatively short dis-
tance (up to 12km). Note, in this case, no positive key
rate can be achieved with detector1 alone at any distance.
In practice, the reconciliation algorithm is not perfect.
Fig.7 shows the simulation results with a realistic RR
protocol (V = 20, β = 0.8, other parameters are same
as before). With the “dual detectors” method, we see a
significant improvement of the key rate (more than one
order) at relatively short distance (up to 5km). Again,
no positive key rate can be achieved with detector1 alone
at any distance.
We remark that the above security analysis about
GMCS QKD, which are cited from [5] may be only ap-
plicable to individual attacks. The security of GMCS
7FIG. 7: Simulation results for GMCS QKD with realistic
RR protocol. Simulation parameters: α = 0.21dB/km,
V = 20, β = 0.8; Gdet = 0.8, εpre = 0.05[21]; r1 = 82MHz,
εdet1 = 0.43 [23]; r2 = 1MHz, εdet2 = 0.01[21]. With the
“dual-detectors” method, we see a significant improvement of
the key rate (more than one order) at relatively short dis-
tance(up to 4km). Note, in this case, no positive key rate can
be achieved with detector1 alone at any distance.
protocol under the most general attack is under investi-
gation [24].
V. DISCUSSION
The performance of a QKD system in Telecom wave-
length is mainly determined by the performance of its
detection system. To achieve high speed, long distance
QKD, fast and noiseless detectors on demand. Unfortu-
nately, in practice, a faster detector is more noisy. Here,
we propose a “dual detectors” scheme to improve the
performance of a practical QKD system with realistic
detectors. Our simulation results demonstrate a signifi-
cant improvements of the secure key rate in some QKD
protocols.
There are two practical issues on implementing the
“dual detectors” method. First, an important assump-
tion of our “dual detector” idea is that a signal from
Eve cannot fool the two detectors by behaving differently.
Such an assumption must not be taken for granted. In-
stead, it should be examined carefully in any practical
system. However, we note that there are various de-
fense strategies that Alice and Bob can employ to make
our assumption more realistic. For instance, to prevent
Eve from attacking the two detectors differently, Bob has
to make sure that the shapes of spectral (temporal) re-
sponses of the two detectors are identical to Eve. Nor-
mally, a photon detector has a spectral response range
from tens of nm to larger than 100nm, while the spectral
width of the laser pulse from Alice is less than 1nm. By
placing a narrowband optical filter (with a bandwidth of
∼ 1 nm) at the entrance of Bob’s system, we can safely
assume that the spectral responses of both detectors are
flat in this spectral window. On the other hand, to pre-
vent Eve from exploring the different temporal responses
of the two detectors and launch the “time-shift” attack
[25], a high speed optical switch with a well defined open-
window can be employed to randomly guide the input
photon to one of the two detectors. Because for each in-
coming pulse, this switch is only opened for a well defined
time window (say 100ps, which is narrower than the re-
sponse times of both detectors), from Eve’s point of view,
the two detectors have the same temporal response.
Secondly, detector2 has a slow response (or large time
jitter), if there are more than one pulses are sent to it
within its response window, then Bob cannot tell which
incoming pulse the detection event correspondences to
and the QBER will be increased. Here, we show that
this increase of QBER can be neglected in practice if
Bob chooses detector2 with a small probability.
In BB84 protocol, assuming the period of the signal
pulse is Tsig, and the time resolution (time jitter) of de-
tector2 is Tdet. In each single response window of detec-
tor2, there are k = Tdet/Tsig pulses sent out by Alice.
Bob randomly chooses to use either detector1 (with a
probability of 1 − p) or detector2 (with a probability of
p) to measure the input pulse. In each Tdet time window,
the probabilities that Bob does not choose detector2,
chooses it one time, or chooses it more than one time are
P0 = (1− p)
k, P1 = kp(1− p)
k−1 and PM = 1−P0−P1,
respectively. Assuming that p << k << 1, we have
P1 = kp − k(k − 1)p
2 and PM = k(k − 1)p
2/2. Note
the probability that Bob chooses detector2 only one time
(in the Tdet time window)and he does detect a signal
is Psig = µηP1, where µ is the average photon number
per pulse, and η is the overall transmission efficiency (in-
cluding the channel efficiency, the optical transmittance
in Bob’s system, and the efficiency of detector2). This is
an effective detection. On the other hand, if Bob chooses
detector2 more than one time and he does detect a signal,
then he has to randomly assign this detection event to
one of the input pulses he chooses. If we assume that the
major contribution to PM comes from P2, then probabil-
ity for Bob to get a “messed detection” is Perr = 2µηPM ,
where the factor 2 takes into account that two pulses have
been sent to detector2. The error rate of these “messed
detection” is 1/4, because half of the time, Bob will as-
sign the detection event to the right pulse (no error), the
other half of time, Bob will assign the detection event to
the wrong pulse (1/2 error). The overall QBER due to







(k − 1)p (20)
Using Tdet = 100ns [18], Tsig = 1ns (1GHz pulse repe-
tition rate), we have k = 100. If we assume p = 10−4,
then QBER = 0.25%, which is negligible.
In GMCS QKD, “multi pulses” detected in the same
8time resolution window will cause extra “excess noise”.
Assuming the “two pulses” probability makes the major
contribution to “multi pulses” probability, if Bob ran-
domly assigns his measurement result to one of the two
incoming pulses, then the other pulse is equivalent to an
extra “excess noise” ǫex ≈ V , where V = VA + 1 is the
variance of Alice’s field quadratures in shot-noise units.
Since the ratio between PM and P1 is around kp, on av-
erage, the increase of “excess noise” can be estimated by
kpV . Assuming k = 100, V = 20, to keep this extra
“excess noise” below 0.05, we require p = 2.5× 10−5.
We remark that the minimum p achievable in practice
is limited by the extinction ratio of the optical switch. In
order to achieve such a small p as 2.5×10−5, multi-stage
optical switch may be required. On the other hand, it
may be possible to overcome this “multi pulses” prob-
lem by improving the protocol. For example, Bob can
prepares his random pattern for the optical switch in the
following way: if the nth pulse is assigned to the slow de-
tector, then the next r pulses (r is determined by the time
resolution of the slow detector) will not be assigned to it.
This is equivalent to introduce a “virtual dead time” to
the slow detector. This won’t affect the security of this
scheme. Since the main assumption that each individual
incoming pulse be randomly assigned to one of the two
detectors still holds.
We remark that the slow response of detector2 also pre-
vents Bob from using a passive beam splitter to replace
the optical switch. In that case, Bob can’t tell which
input pulse correspondences to the detection event from
detetor2.
The security proof of a practical QKD system roots on
its underlying assumptions: what kinds of imperfections
exist, what Eve can control/know about Alice and Bob’s
systems. Obviously, if we allow Eve to control/know ev-
erything (like which SPD clicks in BB84 QKD), then se-
cure QKD is hopeless. On the other hand, people nor-
mally assume that the loss inside Bob’s system and the
dark count of Bob’s SPD are under Eve’s control. In
this case, secure QKD is still possible. Unfortunately, in
practice, there are no clear rules on determining what as-
sumptions should be chosen. Some assumptions may en-
force the security of a QKD system dramatically without
comprise its efficiency, while others may damage the effi-
ciency greatly without contributing much to security. It
is important to inspect all those underlying assumptions
behind a practical QKD system carefully. Security is
done not only on paper, but also as a real-life struggle of
life and death in the code-making and code-breaking ef-
forts with practical crypto-systems. Therefore, it will be
very interesting to experimentally test our assumption-
that a signal cannot fool the two detectors by behaving
differently-in a practical QKD system. Such a test will
lead to a better understanding and potential refinements
of our assumption.
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